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The Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT) is a measure of analytical reasoning that cues an
intuitive but incorrect response that must be rejected for successful performance to
be attained. The CRT yields two types of errors: Intuitive errors, which are attributed
to Type 1 processes; and non-intuitive errors, which result from poor numeracy skills
or deficient reasoning. Past research shows that participants who commit the highest
numbers of errors on the CRT overestimate their performance the most, whereas those
with the lowest error-rates tend to slightly underestimate. This is an example of the
Dunning-Kruger Effect (DKE). The present study examined how intuitive vs. non-intuitive
errors contribute to overestimation in the CRT at different levels of performance. Female
undergraduate students completed a seven-item CRT test and subsequently estimated
their raw score. They also filled out the Faith in Intuition (FI) questionnaire, which is
a dispositional measure of intuitive thinking. Data was separated into quartiles based
on level of performance on the CRT. The results demonstrated the DKE. Additionally,
intuitive and non-intuitive errors predicted miscalibration among low, but not high
performers. However, intuitive errors were a stronger predictor of miscalibration. Finally,
FI was positively correlated with CRT self-estimates and miscalibration, indicating that
participants who perceived themselves to be more intuitive were worse at estimating
their score. These results taken together suggest that participants who perform poorly
in the CRT and also those who score higher in intuitive thinking disposition are more
susceptible to the influences of heuristic-based cues, such as answer fluency, when
judging their performance.
Keywords: Dunning-Kruger Effect, overconfidence, cognitive reflection test, answer fluency, reasoning, Type 1
and Type 2 processes

INTRODUCTION
People overestimate their level of skill, knowledge, and performance in a variety of contexts
(Dunning et al., 2003; De Bruin et al., 2017; Sanchez and Dunning, 2018). Miscalibration between
estimated and actual performance follows a consistent pattern. People with the lowest scores on
a test tend to show the highest overestimations of their performance, midrange performers show
less overestimation, and the best performers tend to slightly underestimate themselves (e.g., Kruger
and Dunning, 1999; Burson et al., 2006; Ehrlinger et al., 2008; Moore and Healy, 2008; Pennycook
et al., 2017). This phenomenon is known as the Dunning-Kruger Effect (DKE). It has been the
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focus of much research in a large part due to what it implies about
self-regulated learning. Not knowing the extent to which one
lacks knowledge or skills within a particular domain can lead to
the implementation of suboptimal strategies during study, which
in turn may hinder learning and performance. And worse, the
DKE may prevent people from overcoming deficits in knowledge
or skills because one of the prerequisites for self-improvement
is the recognition of one’s own shortcomings. Although the
link between performance level and calibration accuracy is wellestablished in the literature, the reasons why low performers
show greater levels of overconfidence is yet not well-understood.
To shed light on this, the present study explores the DKE within
the context of a reflective-reasoning test, where a compelling,
intuitive but incorrect response must be overridden for successful
performance to be attained.
Initial exploration of the DKE focused on tests of grammar,
logical reasoning, and humor (Kruger and Dunning, 1999). It
was hypothesized that people with deficits in knowledge or skills
in a particular domain would be less likely to recognize those
deficits, and therefore would be more likely to overestimate their
performance. To test the hypothesis, in three separate studies,
participants completed a task that measured their knowledge of
American Standard Written English, their ability to analyze and
evaluate arguments, and their ability to identify good jokes. Upon
completion of each task participants were prompted to estimate
their raw score as well as how well they did relative to their
peers. Kruger and Dunning separated their data into quartiles
based on participants’ actual performance, and compared that
performance to their assessments of themselves. This analysis
yielded a common pattern across all three studies. Participants
in the bottom quartile overestimated their performance in terms
of absolute and relative judgments, whereas those in the upper
quartile underestimated. However, it was not only the direction
of miscalibration that differed between the bottom and upper
quartiles. Miscalibration was much greater for low performers,
indicating that low performers are the ones least aware of how
much they actually know.
Many other studies have reported similar findings in
various domains, including knowledge-based tests like geography
(Ehrlinger and Dunning, 2003), skill-based tests of driving
(Marottoli and Richardson, 1998), card gaming (Simons, 2013),
sport coaching (Sullivan et al., 2019), and ability-based tests
of emotional intelligence (Sheldon et al., 2014). Kruger and
Dunning (1999) posited that low performers overestimate
because accurate self-assessment depends on the same set of
skills and knowledge as performance. In their view, deficits in
on-line metacognitive monitoring, due to limited knowledge
or skills, are the main cause of overestimation. Such deficits
hinder participants’ ability to discriminate incorrect from correct
responses, causing errors to go undetected. Dunning’s (2011)
summarizes this by stating that because low performers are
“operating from incomplete and corrupted knowledge, they
would make many mistakes and not recognize those mistakes as
they made them” (p. 260). Such inability to identify ones’ own
errors in turn causes low performers to believe they performed
much better than they actually did, leading to poorly-calibrated
self-estimates. This theoretical account of the DKE is known as
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the double-burden hypothesis because limited knowledge places
two burdens on individuals: it prevents them from producing
correct responses and also from recognizing when their responses
were incorrect. Additional explanations of the DKE have also
been proposed. For example, researchers have suggested that
regression to mean could elicit similar patterns of overestimation
(Krueger and Mueller, 2002; Feld et al., 2017). But studies showed
that this artifact can only explain part of the effect, not all (see
Ehrlinger et al., 2008). In support of Kruger and Dunning’s
(1999) account of the DKE, evidence suggests that metacognitive
differences in on-line monitoring exist between low and high
performers (McIntosh et al., 2019). Yet, the reasons why limited
knowledge is associated with one’s inability to recognize one’s
own mistakes, and whether failings in on-line metacognitive
monitoring are the main driver of overestimation are still not
clear, and therefore deserve further investigation.
Recently, researchers started utilizing a performance-based
measure of analytical reasoning, the Cognitive Reflection Test
(CRT) to explore the DKE within the context of dual-process
theories of cognition (Pennycook et al., 2017). Dual-process
theories hold that humans have two distinct modes of thinking:
Type 1 and Type 2 processing modes (Evans and Stanovich,
2013). Type 1 processes are characterized as fast, effortless,
and heuristic-based, and its outputs are intuitions. In contrast,
Type 2 processes are slower, effortful, rule-based and have the
potential to override Type 1 outputs. Although humans are
capable of engaging in both types of processes, research shows
that individuals differ in their willingness and propensity to
engage in Type 2 processing (Pennycook et al., 2015a). Some
people are more likely to rely on Type 2 processes to solve
problems than others. Such individuals are classified as analytical
thinkers, whereas those who are more likely to engage in Type 1
processing are referred as intuitive thinkers. A range of benefits
has been associated with the analytical cognitive style, including
heightened metacognitive monitoring during reasoning (Mata
et al., 2013; Thompson and Johnson, 2014; Pennycook et al.,
2015b). For example, Mata and colleagues showed that analytic
thinkers are more accurate in their estimates of performance than
intuitive individuals. These findings are in line with Kruger and
Dunning’s (1999) account of the DKE. They also point toward the
importance of examining the role of Type I mode of processing in
overconfidence to better understand the DKE. The current study
attempted to do that using the CRT.
The original CRT is a three-item measure of analytical
reasoning developed by Frederick (2005). Each question is
structured in such way that cues an easily accessible, compelling,
but incorrect intuitive answer. Successful performance in the
CRT thus depends on participants’ capacity and willingness to
engage in analytical processing to overcome the initial intuitive
response. For example, consider the following widely known CRT
problem: “A bat and a ball cost $1.10 in total. The bat costs $1.00
more than the ball. How much does the ball cost? ___cents.” The
answer that readily comes to mind is 10, which is both intuitive
and incorrect. The correct answer is 5 cents ($.05 ball + $1.05
bat = $1.10), which is attained through deliberative reasoning
intervention. In this case, X + (X + 1) = 1.10, solve for X. As
participants reflect upon the intuitive answer, a conflict arises
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results showed a robust negative correlation between the amount
of time taken to respond and feeling of rightness. The shorter
was the time to respond, the more confident they were in the
correctness of their responses, indicating that participants utilize
answer fluency as cue for constructing local, metacognitive
judgments. Given that answer fluency is predictive of feeling of
rightness, and general estimates of performance are judgments
based on how many items participants believe they answered
correctly, it is reasonable to assume that answer fluency may also
influence general estimates of performance. Such influence may
occur because answers that are generated more fluently, and thus
accompanied by stronger feeling of rightness, are more likely to
be counted as correct when participants estimate their total score
in a test.
Thompson et al. (2011) showed that increases in answer
fluency influence confidence in the accuracy of a response. The
higher the fluency, the more confident participants were that a
response was correct. This effect was observed even though there
were no differences in objective accuracy across responses. All
intuitive responses were incorrect. This shows that participants
utilized fluency as a cue for judging the accuracy of a response
even though such cue was not predictive of performance.
Considering these findings and Ackerman and Leiser’s (2014)
report that low performing students are more likely to rely on
unreliable cues when assessing the correctness of their answers,
we propose that low performers’ difficulty in recognizing their
own mistakes may result from overreliance on fluency as a cue
for local, metacognitive judgments. That is, low performers may
be more likely than higher performers to interpret increases
in fluency as an indication that a response is correct. Because
of that, low performers end up not recognizing their own
errors, and therefore overestimating their overall performance.
If indeed having limited knowledge and skills increases one’s
susceptibility to the influences of fluency, we would expect that
low performers would be less likely to recognize they made
a mistake when the response was intuitive than when it was
non-intuitive-incorrect. Hence, intuitive responses should be a
stronger predictor of overestimation than non-intuitive incorrect
responses. On the other hand, such a pattern is not expected
among high performers, or at least not to the same degree. This
prediction is in line with Mata’s, Ferreira and Sherman (2013)
suggestion that more-analytic thinkers, like those who perform
well on the CRT, naturally initiate Type 2 processing to verify the
accuracy of intuitive responses.
In the present study, our aim was to investigate the
relationship between intuitive responses and calibration accuracy
at different performance levels on the CRT. Participants
completed the CRT and then estimated their performance. They
also filled out the Faith in Intuition scale, which is a self-report
measure of intuitive thinking disposition. We wanted to know if
self-reported intuitive thinking disposition influences estimates
of performance. Participants were separated into quartiles
based on their objective performance on the CRT, and the
average number of intuitive-incorrect, non-intuitive-incorrect
and correct responses were calculated per participant per
quartile. Actual CRT scores were subtracted from estimated CRT
scores to calculate calibration accuracy. We tested the hypothesis

between the intuitive and the analytical solution, prompting them
to reject the intuitive answer and accept the analytical one.
It is important to add that participants’ responses to the CRT
fall into three categories: analytical-correct, intuitive-incorrect,
and non-intuitive-incorrect solutions. In the example above,
“5 cents” is the analytical-correct solution whereas “10 cents”
is an intuitive-incorrect solution. Non-intuitive-incorrect on
the other hand would be any response that is neither correct
nor match the intuitive-incorrect solution. The correct solution
is elicited through the intervention of analytical or Type 2
processing. Conversely, intuitive responses are the product of
Type 1 processing, and lastly non-intuitive-incorrect responses
result from poor numeracy skills or deficient reasoning (Hertzog
et al., 2018). In addition to Frederick’s (2005) three-item CRT,
there are newer versions of the CRT, including Toplak’s et al.
(2014) seven-item CRT and Thomson and Oppenheimer’s (2016)
four-item CRT.
Because the CRT cues a reliable but incorrect intuitive
response, it has the potential to shed light into how mistakes
elicited by Type 1 processes contribute to overconfidence
particularly in relation to other, more general mistakes. To
date, however, only one study examined the DKE utilizing
the CRT. Pennycook et al. (2017) created an 8-item CRT by
combining Toplak’s et al. (2014) four-item CRT with Thomson
and Oppenheimer’s (2016) four-item CRT. Participants in their
study first completed the 8-item CRT and then estimated their
raw score in the test. The results showed that less-analytic
individuals—that is, participants with the lowest scores (0–2
points) greatly overestimated their performance. Their mean
estimated score was 4.78 whereas the average number of correct
responses was 1.42. Their degree of miscalibration was therefore
3.4 points, which was much higher than 1.1 observed in high
performers. In summary, Pennycook et al. (2017) replicated the
DKE using the CRT and by doing so demonstrated that less
analytic-individuals are the ones who appear to be the least aware
of their reasoning abilities, as indicated by the large discrepancy
between actual and estimated scores.
Pennycook and colleagues did not examine the role of Type 1
outputs, intuitive responses, on overestimation. Understanding
the influences of intuitive responses on miscalibration is
important because it can help unveil the mechanisms
mediating the DKE, particularly why low performers have
difficulty recognizing their own mistakes, and therefore greatly
overestimate their performance (Kruger and Dunning, 1999;
Dunning, 2011). Intuitive responses differ from the other two
responses in terms of answer fluency—that is, the speed or ease
by which an answer is generated (Pennycook et al., 2015a). They
are produced more fluently (quickly) than analytical-correct and
non-intuitive-incorrect responses. Additionally, previous studies
have shown that variations in the speed in which an answer
is generated predicts how confident participants are on the
correctness of their answer (Thompson et al., 2011, 2013). For
example, in Thompson et al. (2011), participants were presented
with a reasoning task, instructed to give the first answer came to
mind to each question, and right after generating a response rate
their feeling of rightness on the answer provided—that is rate
how certain they were their responses were in fact correct. The
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• Jerry received both the 15th highest and the 15th lowest mark
in the class. How many students are in the class? ______
students (correct answer: 29 students; intuitive answer: 30).
• A man buys a pig for $60, sells it for $70, buys it back for $80,
and sells it finally for $90. How much has he made? _____
dollars (correct answer: $20; intuitive answer: $10].
• Simon decided to invest $8,000 in the stock market 1 day early
in 2008. Six months after he invested, on July 17, the stocks he
had purchased were down 50%. Fortunately for Simon, from
July 17 to October 17, the stocks he had purchased went up
75%. At this point, Simon has: a. broken even in the stock
market, b. is ahead of where he began, c. has lost money
(correct answer: c, because the value at this point is $7,000;
intuitive response: b).
• If you’re running a race and you pass the person in second
place, what place are you in? (correct answer: second; intuitive
answer: first).
• A farmer had 15 sheep and all but eight died. How many are
left? (correct answer: 8; intuitive answer: 7).
• Emily’s father has three daughters. The first two are named
April and May. What is the third daughter’s name? (correct
answer: Emily; intuitive answer: June).

that intuitive responding contributes to miscalibration among
low performers but not high performers. We also hypothesized
that intuitive-incorrect responses are a stronger predictor of
overestimation than non-intuitive-incorrect responses among
low performers, and that increased faith in intuition leads to
increased miscalibration.

METHODS
Participants
Participants were recruited through an email sent by faculty
members to undergraduate students registered in psychology
courses at Zayed University, Abu Dhabi campus. One-hundred
and seventy-eight undergraduate female students enrolled in
psychology courses at Zayed Universityparticipated in the study.
Participants with missing data were excluded from the data
analysis. There were nine participants who did not provide an
estimate of their CRT performance, and therefore were excluded.
A total of 169 participants were included in the data analysis.
Participants ages ranged from 18 to 32 with a mean of 21. Most
participants were from the United Arab Emirates (155), and the
remaining were from Yemen (N = 4), Oman (N = 4), Bahrain
(N = 3), Eritrea (N = 2), and Somalia (N = 1). Most participants
were majoring in psychology (N = 160) while a few came from
other majors, including business (N = 1), communication (N =
4), marketing (N = 3), and nutrition (N = 1). Participants were
all bilingual in English and Arabic. The institutional language is
English. The study received ethical approval from the institution’s
research ethics committee (R17101). All participants gave written
informed consent prior to the study’s commencement.

The estimate of internal consistency (Cronbach’s alpha) for all
seven items was 0.36. The low level of internal consistency
could be the result of lack of homogeneity among items from
the two scales or the small number of items. Each of the
questions bring about three possible solutions. Participants
responses were coded as correct if they matched the correct
solution, and as intuitive-incorrect if they corresponded to the
intuitive solution. Participants could also give a response that was
neither intuitive-incorrect nor correct. Such answers are coded
as non-intuitive-incorrect.

Materials

Faith in Intuition

Cognitive Reflection Test

Faith in Intuition (FI) is a self-report measure of intuitive
thinking disposition developed by Pacini and Epstein (1999).
It consists of two subscales: Experiential Ability (E-A) and
Experiential Engagement (E-E), each containing 10 items
(see survey in Supplementary Material). Experiential Ability
measures confidence level on intuitive impressions and feelings.
Experiential Engagement measures reliance on and enjoyment
on intuition in decision making. Each statement is rated by
participants from 1 to 5 according to how well it applies to them;
where 1 indicates completely false and 5 indicates completely
true. The full FI’s internal reliability in the current study was
acceptable, α = 0.77.

The CRT measures analytical thinking. Each problem in the
CRT cues an intuitive-incorrect response, which participants are
supposed to override to reach the correct solution. There are
three well-known versions of the CRT. The original CRT consists
of three questions developed by Frederick (2005). An extended
version of it was then developed by Toplak et al. (2014) that
included four more four new items. Lastly, because the two
CRTs had been widely used, Thomson and Oppenheimer (2016)
developed a new one including four questions. We opted not to
use Frederick’s 3-item CRT because of its wide use in research
and in class demonstrations. Instead, similar to Pennycook et al.
(2017), we combined two versions of the CRT, Toplak’s et al.
(2014) 4-new items and Thomson and Oppenheimer’s (2016)
CRT-2. However, the fourth item of CRT-2 was not included
because of participants’ lack of familiarity with some of the terms
covered in the question. In total, the test had seven items as
shown below:

Design and Procedure
Upon arrival in the laboratory, participants were greeted by
a research assistant and directed to a workstation with a
computer. After giving informed consent to participate in
the study, participants filled out a demographic questionnaire
and subsequently received detailed instructions about how to
complete the CRT. The CRT included seven questions, and they
were presented to participants on paper. After completing the
last question in the test, participants were asked to evaluate their

• If John can drink one barrel of water in 6 days, and Mary
can drink one barrel of water in 12 days, how long would it
take them to drink one barrel of water together? _____ days
(correct answer: 4 days; intuitive answer: 9).
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performance by answering the following question: “how many
of the seven items do you think you answered correctly?” Lastly,
they filled out the FI questionnaire.

TABLE 1 | Descriptive Statistics [M (SD)] for actual CRT scores, estimated CRT
per quartiles.
Quartile

N

CRT scores
M (SD)

CRT estimates
M (SD)

1

70

0.56 (0.5)

4.81 (1.13)

2

50

2.00 (0)

4.94 (0.98)

3

37

3.00 (0)

4.68 (1.18)

4

12

4.25 (0.62)

5.25 (1.05)

Data Analysis
To investigate degree of overestimation (or underestimation),
we calculated a calibration score (estimated score—actual score)
for each student. Positive values correspond to overestimation
and negative to underestimation. The absolute value of the
difference score, or calibration accuracy, was also calculated, in
order to examine the accuracy of the performance judgments.
Calibration accuracy was computed as |estimated performance–
actual performance|. The ideal score would be 0.
To evaluate the main hypotheses of the present study, a
series of regression analysis were conducted using IBM SPSS
Statistics, version 26. Specifically, multiple regressions were
carried out to evaluate whether intuitive and non-intuitive
errors predict miscalibration across participants at different levels
of performance, as well as for the whole sample. Predictor
variables were checked for multicollinearity. Single regressions
were also performed to evaluate the predictive value of combined
intuitive and correct CRT scores in predicting estimated CRT.
Finally, additional single regressions were conducted to probe FI
contributions to estimated CRT scores and miscalibration.

(M = 0.56, SD = 0.5) on average estimated that they had a score
of 4.81 (SD = 1.13), overestimating their performance by 4.26
points, t (69) = 29.68, p < 0.001. Similarly, students in the lower
and upper middle quartile overestimated their performance by
2.9, t (49) = 21.67, p < 0.001 and 1.7, t (36) = 8.63, p < 0.001.
Whereas, high performers overestimated (M = 5.25, SD = 1.05)
their performance (M = 4.25, SD = 0.62), by only 1 point, t (11) =
2.87, p = 0.015.
To be able to compare the magnitude of miscalibration
between participants in the top and bottom quartiles, we followed
the Burson et al. (2006) method and coded miscalibration
as [estimated performance—actual performance] for lowest
performers and [actual performance—estimated performance]
for the top quartile. This transformation is important when
comparing miscalibration between groups because it gives the
means the same sign while maintaining the variance around
the means. Notably, the magnitude of the estimation error was
greater for low (M = 4.26, SD = 1.2) than high performers (M =
1.3, SD = 0.78), t (80) = 8.13, p < 0.001, replicating the DKE.

RESULTS
Overestimation
Participants overestimated their score on the CRT. The mean
estimated score was 4.85 out of 7 (SD = 1.09), whereas the
average number of correct responses was 1.78 (SD = 1.23), t (168)
= 24.8, p < 0.001. Furthermore, participants made significantly
more intuitive-incorrect responses (M = 3.21, SD = 1.29) than
correct responses (M = 1.78, SD = 1.23), t (168) = 7.98, p
< 0.001. Descriptive statistics for correct, intuitive, and nonintuitive incorrect responses per item in the CRT can be found
on Supplementary Table 1.

Error Type Comparison Across Quartiles
A quartile ANOVA was performed on error type (intuitiveand non-intuitive-incorrect responses). The ANOVA yielded
a main effect of error type, [F (1,165) = 30.89], p < 0.001,
η2 = 0.158 and an interaction between quartile and response
type, [F (3,165) = 7.06], p < 0.001, η2 = 0.114. Participants
in general made significantly more intuitive than non-intuitive
errors. But the difference between the number of intuitive
and non-intuitive responses was higher for low performers
(M = 4.21, SD = 1.07) than second (M = 2.82, SD = 0.85,
p < 0.001), third (M = 2.35, SD = 0.89, p < 0.001), and
fourth (M = 1.67, SD = 0.65, p < 0.001) quartiles (See
Figure 2).

Dunning-Kruger Effect
To explore the accuracy of estimated scores across different
levels of objective performance, a quartile-split based on actual
performance in the CRT was used. Mean of actual and estimated
scores for each quartile and its sample size are shown on
Table 1. As a manipulation check, a quartile Analysis of Variance
(ANOVA) on actual performance was performed. Actual scores
differed significantly across quartile, p < 0.001.
To evaluate whether the difference between estimated and
actual scores varied across students at different quartiles,
we conducted a mixed-design ANOVA. The analysis yielded
an interaction between quartile and the difference between
estimated and actual scores, [F (3,165) = 57.73], p < 0.001, η2 =
0.512. A Tukey Honest Significant Difference (HSD) post-hoc test
indicated that the difference between estimated and actual scores
was significantly higher for bottom performers than for second
(p < 0.001), third (p < 0.001) and upper quartile (p < 0.001)
groups. As Figure 1 shows, this difference decreased with an
increase in performance quartile. Students in the bottom quartile

Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org

Predictors of Miscalibration at Different
Performance Levels
To examine the influence of intuitive responses on estimated
CRT scores, we simultaneously regressed calibration scores
on intuitive- and non-intuitive-incorrect responses for each
quartile separately and then for the entire group. With regard
to low performers, intuitive responses were positively related
to overestimation (b = 0.914, se = 0.273, β = 0.819), t (67)
= 3.35, p < 0.001. Non-intuitive errors were also positively
related to overestimation (b = 0.660, se = 0.279, β = 0.578),
t (67) = 2.36, p = 0.021, R² = 0.163, p = 0.003, but to a lesser
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FIGURE 1 | Estimated and actual scores for each performance quartile. Error bars indicate standard error.

Predictors of Estimated CRT Scores at
Different Performance Levels

extent than intuitive errors. Thus, while both intuitive and nonintuitive errors predict overestimation among low performers,
intuitive errors were shown to be a stronger predictor. Because
the top quartile included only 12 participants, we first ran
the analysis including data from only the 12 participants and
subsequently with data from participants from third and fourth
quartiles together (N = 49). Neither intuitive- nor non-intuitiveincorrect responses were significant predictors miscalibration
among participants in the fourth quartile alone (p = 0.120, p
= 0.232) or third and fourth quartile together (p = 0.101, p =
0.534), respectively.
In the overall sample, we found that intuitive responding
was a better predictor of miscalibration, (b = 0.999, se
= 0.072, β = 0.805), t (166) = 13.83, p < 0.001, than
non-intuitive responding (b = 0.837, se = 0.094, β =
0.515), t (166) = 8.86, p < 0.001, R² = 0.547, p < 0.001.
Furthermore, we checked the regression models for
multicollinearity using variance inflation factor (VIF).
The VIF values for the regression models were 4.79
and 1.49 for low performers and for the whole sample,
respectively. This shows that multicollinearity was not a
problem given that it is <10. These results, taken together,
support the hypothesis that intuitive responding is a
major factor contributing to miscalibration in the CRT,
and that it is particularly a problem for the least capable
analytical reasoners.

Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org

The previous analyses showed that intuitive responding predicts
miscalibration among low performers but not high performers.
This suggests that bottom performers were less likely to recognize
the intuitive responses as incorrect, and hence more likely to
factor them into their estimate along with the correct responses,
causing them to overestimate. If such a hypothesis is correct, then
we would expect that a combined score including intuitive and
correct responses would be a stronger predictor of estimated CRT
scores than correct responses alone. To test that, we regressed
estimated CRT scores on combined intuitive and correct scores
for each quartile separately and then for the whole sample. The
analysis showed that combined scores were positively associated
with estimated CRT scores for low performers only, (b = 0.262,
se = 0.127, β = 0.244), t (69) = 2.07, p = 0.042, R² = 0.059, p
= 0.042. All the other analyses were not statistically significant.
Furthermore, we looked at whether correct responses alone, or
intuitive responses predicted estimated CRT scores. Neither the
relationship between correct and estimated CRT Score, β =
0.83, p = 0.495, nor intuitive and estimated CRT scores were
significant, β = 0.20, p = 0.1. These results show that the
best predictor of estimated scores is neither correct responses
nor intuitive responses alone, but a combined measure of both
responses. This supports the idea that low performers may be
especially more likely to perceive the intuitive response as correct.
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FIGURE 2 | The average number of intuitive and non-intuitive errors for each performance quartile. Error bars indicate standard error.

Faith in Intuition and Estimated CRT Score

miscalibration. Specifically, on a test that was out of seven points
low performers overestimated their CRT score by 4.26, while high
performers miscalibrated by just 1. Moreover, low performers
made significantly more intuitive than non-intuitive errors, in
a ratio much higher than the upper-quartile performers. This
suggests that low performers were either (1) less likely to initiate
Type 2 processes to verify the correctness of the intuitive response
or that (2) initiation of Type 2 processes did not lead to a change
of the initial response. This could occur if the output generated by
Type 2 processes was not convincing enough for low performers
to endorse it.
In support of our hypothesis, intuitive-incorrect responses
were stronger predictors of miscalibration than non-intuitive
incorrect responses among students in the bottom quartile. Such
relationship was not present among high performers. Neither
intuitive nor non-intuitive errors predicted miscalibration
among those in the top quartile. A possible explanation is that
low and high performers do not utilize the same cues, or at
least not to the same extent, when judging the accuracy of their
responses. Low performers may be more likely to use surfacebased cues, such as answer fluency, which are not reliable.
This conclusion is consistent with previous research showing
differences in cue utilization among students at different levels
of performance (Thiede et al., 2010; Ackerman and Leiser, 2014;
Gutierrez de Blume et al., 2017). For instance, Ackerman and
Leiser (2014) reported that low achievers – when regulating their

No differences in self-report of intuitive thinking disposition
were found across quartiles, despite the fact that low performers
had significantly more intuitive responses than any other group.
FI was also not related to intuitive responding in the CRT,
p = 0.284, nor actual CRT scores, p = 0.509. However, we
found that FI predicted estimated CRT scores, (b = 0.490, se
= 0.176, β = 0.211), t (167) = 2.79, p = 0.006. FI also predicted
miscalibration when performance was controlled (b = 0.486, se
= 0.176, β = 0.142), t (167) = 2.77, p = 0.007, R² = 0.20, p =
0.007. This indicates that intuitive thinking disposition cannot
account for poor performance in general, but it contributes to
how participants estimate their performance. That is, people
who perceived themselves to be more intuitive tended to give
higher estimates of performance and also showed a higher level
of miscalibration.

DISCUSSION
The current study examined the contribution of intuitive errors
relative to non-intuitive errors to miscalibration among low and
high performers on the CRT. It also tested whether intuitive
thinking disposition is related to miscalibration. Consistent
with prior studies, we replicated the DKE. Participants with
the highest number of errors showed the highest degree of

Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org

7

April 2021 | Volume 12 | Article 603225

Coutinho et al.

Intuitive Errors and Overconfidence

or to people across cultures. It is however notable that Emirati
participants performed similarly to their Western counterparts
in other studies. We hope that future research will complement
the present study by including participants from both genders
and from other cultures. We also did not measure response
time for each question in the CRT. A measure of response
time would provide us with additional evidence that intuitive
responses were indeed produced quicker than analytical correct
and non-intuitive incorrect responses. Future studies should
consider adding such measure.
It is important to point out that regression to the mean
has been shown to explain part of the DKE, but not all
(Krueger and Mueller, 2002; Feld et al., 2017). This influence is
more prominent for relative judgments than absolute judgments
(Dunning, 2011; McIntosh et al., 2019). In our study we used
absolute judgments, yet it is possible that regression to the mean
had an effect on the degree of miscalibration found and might
account for our DKE results. A similar case could be made for
motivational biases, wishful thinking, etc. If this were the case, it
could have had an indirect effect on the main novel finding that
intuitive responses predicted miscalibration in low performers
but not high performers. It is unclear whether regression
or motivational effects would explain why intuitive responses
were stronger predictors of overconfidence than non-intuitive
responses. Still, it would have been beneficial if we had attempted
to eliminate such artifact by for example using different sets
of questions to measure response accuracy and miscalibration
(Klayman et al., 1999; Burson et al., 2006; Feld et al., 2017).
Similarly, more insight could be gained into the motivational
value participants assigned to the task, and whether these can
help distinguish between a true DKE and regression to the mean.
Additionally, while our Faith in Intuition measure yielded an
interesting result that may generalize to other domains, there
are a wide variety of other cognitive, social, personal, and
motivational factors that might help predict miscalibration that
should also be taken into consideration. Finally, more research
is needed to explore the link between intuitive responding and
estimation error, particularly with regard to the role of answer
fluency, and also whether educational training programs could
minimize the influence of heuristic-based cues on local and global
metacognitive judgments.
The current findings raise an important question: Why do
participants with lower scores in the CRT seem more susceptible
to low-validity cues, such as answer fluency? One possibility
is that when low performers initiate Type 2 processing, the
output generated is often wrong due to limitations in the system.
Therefore, this causes them to rely more on their intuitions.
Because Type 1 processes yield sensible solutions for everyday
problems, confidence in them may increase. As confidence
in intuitive thinking increases, they rely more on fluency as
an indication of successful learning or performance. However,
increases in fluency may be caused by factors other than learning
and knowing. Relying on fluency thus causes low performers
to make several mistakes when judging their performance, and
these metacognitive mistakes cause illusory thinking that itself
decreases performance and increases confidence. Challenging
this faith in intuition could be an important step in correcting the

learning of text—were more sensitive to unreliable, surface-level
cues than high achievers. Moreover, Thiede et al. (2010)
demonstrated that at-risk readers were more likely to rely on
surface-based cues (e.g., ease of processing, readability, length,
and specific vocabulary) when judging text comprehension,
whereas competent readers based their judgments on valid
comprehension-based cues, such as the belief they can explain
the text to another person. It is yet unclear why low performers
may be more likely to rely on unreliable cues when judging their
performance. We argue that limited knowledge or skills, in the
domain tested, may be one of the factors driving such bias. For
example, limited knowledge or skills could influence cue selection
by limiting the number of cues available to the learner, directing
the learner’s attention to particular unreliable cues, or leading to
the formation of erroneous beliefs regarding the validity of cues.
The findings showing that intuitive responses are a stronger
predictor of miscalibration than non-intuitive incorrect
responses among low performers are in line with our proposal
that differences in answer fluency between response types give
rise to different metacognitive experiences regarding confidence
in the accuracy of the responses, which in turn influence general
estimates of performance. As stated earlier, it is possible that
low performers interpret increases in fluency as evidence that
their intuitive responses are correct, and therefore do not initiate
analytical Type 2 processing to double-check. This then causes
them to make more intuitive errors and also to count intuitive
responses as evidence of good performance when estimating
their test score. This argument is in line with previous studies
showing that highly fluent responses are endorsed with higher
confidence independently of objective accuracy (Thompson
et al., 2011, 2013).
Furthermore, when it comes to upper quartile performers,
neither intuitive nor non-intuitive errors predicted
miscalibration. This finding is probably due to how more
analytic- performers interpret answer fluency accompanying
intuitive responses. We believe they do not interpret it as an
indication that the answer is correct. Thus, when they make an
intuitive mistake, they do not endorse it with high confidence.
This is in line with previous studies suggesting that analytical
individuals have a metacognitive advantage over those who are
less analytical given that the former are aware that the intuitive
answer is often biased and needs to be verified (Mata et al., 2013).
We also found that self-reported intuitive thinking disposition
measured by FI predicted miscalibration. Participants who
perceived themselves to be more intuitive were the ones with the
largest discrepancy in estimated vs. actual scores. This indicates
that people who enjoy and trust their intuition are less likely
to recognize when they make a mistake and therefore end
up overestimating their performance. This finding is consistent
with the main results of the present study showing that
responses mediated by Type 1 processes are more susceptible to
metacognitive illusions.

Limitations and Future Directions
The present study included only female participants and 92%
were from the UAE. Considering this limitation, we do not know
if the outcome of this study would generalize to males in the UAE
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Interventions to improve self-awareness that specifically focus on
intuitive biases and fluency may help low performers spot errors,
improve metacognitively, and increase performance.

problem. Future research could help low performers to identify
and utilize more reliable cues by first demonstrating errors of
intuition and then focusing on metacognitive skills. This would
be consistent with Schwarz’s, Sanna, Skurnik and Yoon (2007)
efforts to de-bias people in a variety of domains, in which they
note that judgements in one domain (e.g., faith in intuition)
can affect judgements in another domain (e.g., performance
estimates) even when the two judgements are not directly related.
Demonstrating the futility of one domain through educational
interventions could help properly calibrate the other.

DATA AVAILABILITY STATEMENT
The dataset for this study can be found in the OSFHOME
repository through the following link: https://osf.io/ay23s/?view_
only=8803bb83b470401b91dc252b125a86e6.

ETHICS STATEMENT

Conclusion

The studies involving human participants were reviewed and
approved by Research Ethics Committee at Zayed University.
The patients/participants provided their written informed
consent to participate in this study.

We provided evidence that intuitive and non-intuitive
errors contribute to miscalibration among low but not high
performers on the CRT. Intuitive errors are a stronger
predictor of overestimation, and are a particular problem
for low performers. This findings provides support to the
proposal that low performers’ difficulty in recognizing when
they make a mistake is partly due to how they interpret
variations in fluency accompanying different sources of
errors. They seem more likely to view increases in fluency
as an indication that an answer is correct, which then
lead to inflated self-estimates. Consistent with the main
hypothesis, this study also showed that participants who perceive
themselves as highly intuitive are more likely to overestimate
their performance.
The present study has theoretical and methodological
implications to the literature on the DKE, and practical
implications to education. First, it suggests that the type of error,
whether it is elicited by Type 1 processes, poor numeracy skills
or deficient reasoning is likely to give rise to different levels
of feeling of rightness among low performers, influencing thus
their global self-estimates. Second, it shows that the influence of
answer fluency on metacognitive judgments extends to general
estimates of performance, and low performers are the ones most
susceptible to it. Third, it demonstrates the importance of looking
at error type to better understand the mechanisms mediating
the DKE. Fourth, it suggests that proper calibration among low
performers is unlikely to happen by itself. Hence, education at all
developmental levels should directly teach the Dunning-Kruger
Effect, problems with intuition, and related cognitive biases.
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